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The Review Committee on Overseas Representation met
under the Chairmanship of Sir Val Duncan in the latter
part of 1968 and early 1969. The Report of the Review
Committee on Overseas Representation 1968-69 (Miscellan-
eous No. 24 (1969), Command 4107, HMSO price 17s. 6th)
was presented in July 1969. The following articles
discuss its views on Britain's relations with the Third
World.
I) THE DUNCAN COMMITTEE' S VIEWS ON AID ADMINISTRATION
1
by Dudley Seers
The Fellows of the Institute who were at Stanmer
last December put their views onaid administration in
written evidence to the Review.,Committee on Overseas
Representation. In this paper (which was prepared by
Percy Selwyn), we argued that the administrative3needs of
aid were considerable if it was to be effective. Granted
that the main object of aid is to promote development
(which is official policy), assessments need to be made
of cot merely the value of individual capital projects,
often involving help with project preparation, but also
the development priorities of the country. It is true
that there are economists and other professionally
qualified people at the Mini3try of Overseas Development
(0DM) to vet projects. But it is much harder for them to
do this than for people on the spot - and often it is
really too late to turn a project down by the time 0DM
is involved.
The administrative requirements for manpower aid are
even heavier. Technical assistance requests have to be
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should not be concluded that this was the only
aspect of overseas representation that interested us -
aid administration was a subject on which we could
speak from considerable personal experience and
observation.
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clarified and appraised, preferably in coordination
with other possible sources of aid; the Embassy (or
High Connnission) has to satisfy itself that a British
expert will find it possible to work productively in
each job; experts have to be helped to settle in; they
may need new terms of reference after they have been
working for a while; they may need to be withdrawn - or
to have their contract extended. (OSAS appointments
involve somewhat less administration, but not as much less
as might be thought.) Requests for training need to be
judged critically in the light of the candidate's needs
and capacity, and the range of facilities available in
Britain. All projects need evaluation after they are
completed.
If aid is to be properly administered, the staff of
an overseas post should maintain close contact with the
main departments of the government to which they are
accredited. Ideally aid administrators should do much
more than this: they should play a positive role in
searching for ways in which Britain could help overseas
governments deal with their enormous problems. Where
the programme of aid to a country is sizeable (especially
the part of the progranme covering manpower aid), staff
needs are therefore considerable.
The experience of Institute Fellows is that those
dealing with aid at the moment are too few in number
and usually inadequately trained for the job, which is
often combined with other work such as trade promotion.
120 of the rank of executive officer and above are
estimated to be working overseas (full-time equivalent)
on aid administration taking the world as a whole; on
the other hand, in London, about 700 of the saine grades
are working at 0DM. There are, apart from the two
Development Divisions covering the Middle East and the
Caribbean , only three professional posts in aided
countries - for an economist in India, and for agricultur-
alists in Kenya and Nigeria.
Moreover, the spread is very uneven. In Zambia, to
cite an extreme example, the staff administering a total
programme of £15 millions, placing over 700 technical
assistance personnel a year and handling over 100
st,'dpnf a year consisted (in 1161) of one man on. the
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-other hand, in Thailand, with a very small programme, it
was administered by two full-time and two part-time
officers.
We recommended that at least one full-time aid
administrator, with overall responsibility for aid policy,
should be appointed to each of the posts where the aid
programme was over £1 million a year, with more for larger
programmes, and that as an absolute minimum there should
be one official per thousand British technical assistance
personnel working in a country. These should all be
adequately trained, and so far as possible they should not
combine commercial and aid work: (although development
objectives may often coincide with commercial interest,
they should not be confused). Specialists should normally
be appointed where aid programmes exceeded £5 millions a
year, and Development Divisions set up for East Africa,
Southern Africa and the Pacific. The extra staff could
be largely provided by reducing the number working in
London.
The Duncan Canittee Report (Cniid. 4107) which
devotes only five pages, or rather under 3% of ita space,
to aid administration, says that the Committee "feel that"
the number of 120 officials is "not manifestly in need of
increase". Their "impression" was that "a reasonable
balance was being maintained between the cost of admin-
istration and the scale of the programme". "On balance"
they believed that aid and commercial work should be
integrated "in order that the overall objectives of the
Government may be adequately served", and threw in the
rather gratuitous hint that -0DM should be merged with the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, presumably for the same
reason. They "think there is insufficient evidence" in
favour of increasing the number of Development Divisions,
and hint that the Caribbean one should be disbanded in
due course because of the principle of integrating aid
and other work.
Such offhand treatment raises doubts about how
thoroughly the Committee examined the evidence. One has
See 0114 Evidence to the Estimates Committee Report on
Overseas Aid (Report for 1967/68).
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to bear in mind the time three people were given (six
months) to deal with thir terms of reference, which
have been quoted above. These involved them in
considering the structure of the diplomatic service and
ancillary staffs, its management and its work in fields
such as politics, commerce, economics, information
(including external broadcasting) and consular activities
as well as aid. They visited 34 posts (and "touched at"
8 more); took oral evidence from 9 Ministers, several
score officials, 38 individuals, the Chairman of the Area
Conmiittees of the Export Council, staff representatives,
etc.; and read 46 memoranda. A deep examination of aid
administration, based on a study of how a range of
projects had been handled, was no doubt impossible.
Indeed, the Committee might well have decided they
had better exclude what is a complex and important
subject (involving supervision of the spending of some
£200 millions a year) from their hurried investigations.
But the Committee did not come to this conclusion. Perhaps
one could hardly expect aid to appear an important element
in British diplomacy to a Committee which, following
the centric principies of Dante, divided the world into
an "Area of Concentration" i.e. Western Europe and North
America, and an "Outer Area", where political interests
were expected to diminish (with the conspicuous exceptions
of Japan, Australia and South Africa).
It certainly seems far from self-evident that 120
officiais, assuming this estimate is accurate, are adequate
for the field administration of a programme including
capital projects totalling well over £100 millions a year,
placing about 3 thousand new technical assistance personnnel
a year in post, and arranging for more than 5 thousand
students and trainees to come to Britain. The Report's
coy wording, "not manifestly in need of increase", suggests
The reason given in the terms of reference for speed ("that
the benefit of any saving may accrue as rapidly as possible")
is almost comic. One does not know whether to be more
surprised that officials drafted such terms of reference,
that the Foreign Secretary signed them or that the
Coipmittee accepted them. The committee did not in fact
deliver their report quite within this time limit.
that the Committee felt out of its depth; it contains no
clues on how to judge whether 120, or for that matter twice
that number, would be enough; any figure surely has to
be considered in terms of the needs of particular types
of work.
Nor do they indicate what was the "balance" of
evidence that was "insufficient" to justify setting up
additional Development Divisions in particular areas (and
presumably the "balance" would be different for different
parts of the world). The Report speaks approvingly of
"the feel of the region" acquired by the Middle East
Development Division. and the "freedom of action" enjoyed
by the Caribbean Development Division and one wonders
how much weight the members attached to the possibility
of these assets being acquired elsewhere.
The Committee presumably felt that to find some
saving in the cost of overseas representation, which their
terms of reference required them to do, would have been
a much harder task if they had proposed increases in the
number working on aid administration. But clearly the
terms of reference posed the wrong question. The cost
of aid administration. (including the operation of 0DM).
might be compared with that of the aid programne. One
question is whether the total of these, which amounts to
more than twice the cost of total overseas representation
of all kinds, is being deployed in the most efficient way
to meet the given pmrposes of aid or whether more should
be devoted to administration. Linked with this are other
questions: What should be the balance between administra-
tion at home and overseas, and as between various overseas
posts? If these questions were posed, instead of aid
administration being considered in the course of a
critical review of a great composite total called 'overseas
representation', au official committee could handly come
to any conclusion other than that the aid program
needed more administration, that a shift was needed from
London to overseas posts and that the handling of aid
questions by overseas posts needed heavy professional
reinforcement. But how precisely financial aid and
manpower aid of various types should be administered
would require a thorough investigation; it can hardly be
determined as a minor byproduct of a different exercise -
and a very rushed one.
